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P.: Attorney and Client--Disbarment of Attorney For Invoking Fifth Am

CASE COMMENTS
ArroPamy An CLmNT-DSBARMMNT OF ATroRNEY FOR INvomwG Fim AmENDum-DIL OF DUE PROCESs.-D, an attor-

ney, was disbarred for refusing to answer questions concerning his
alleged membership in the communist party by invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal the court stated
that an attorney cannot practice law and be a member of the
communist party because the irreconcilable conflict in philosophies
would prevent him from taking the oath required for admission to
the bar. Here, however, the issue is whether or not the privilege
against self-incrimination is available to an attorney in a disbarment proceeding. Held, that disbarring an attorney merely for invoking the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is a
denial of due process of law. The dissent stated that an attorney
has a right to the constituional protection against self-incrimination
but there is no constitutional right to practice law, only a privilege,
and once he invokes this protection he loses the privilege granted
him by the state. Sheiner v. State, 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
The majority opinion recognizes that the communist ideology
of world revolution is so diametrically opposed to the democratic
philosophy of free government that a lawyer who joins the communist party forfeits his privilege to practice law; the question
here being whether or not due process was accorded D. The historical purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination was to
impede prosecution of crimes in which religious or political belief
was materially involved. Sheiner v. State, supra at 658. However,
it has been said that "if the privilege is to be effective at all it
must be given a comprehensive application, and thus must prevent
compulsory self-incrimination in any proceeding." GRswoLD, THE
Far- AumENmENT TODAY 55 (1955). That this applies to a witness in his general capacity as an individual is not questioned.
However, should attorneys who are in a special position of trust in
the administration of the judicial branch of government be allowed
to invoke it?
The general rule is that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917). "This
license, a personal privilege, is burdened with pre-existing as well
as subsequent conditions calculated to uphold and maintain the
dignity of the court, the ethics of the profession and the welfare
of all concerned with the administration of justice." In re Taylor,
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309 Ky. 388, 217 S.W.2d 954 (1949). It is a privilege with conditions attached, and compliance with these conditions is not only
required at the time of admission to the bar but also afterwards.
In re Rouss, supra. Generally states impose as a condition precedent for admission to the bar the taking of an oath to support the
state and federal constitutions. Such an oath demands loyalty to
our government. Is this loyalty to be demanded only at the moment
of admission or also afterwards?
Although membership in the bar is a privilege, the courts have
not separated an attorney's rights as a citizen and his privilege as
a lawyer. They recognize that as a layman, and as an attorney, he
has the right to invoke the fifth amendment, without losing his
privilege to practice law. In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 548
(1941). Courts have no trouble in making such a distinction when
teachers, policemen, or public officers are involved. In a case involving a teacher invoking the fifth amendment the court stated
that owing to a statute, "the assertion of the privilege against selfincrimination is equivalent to a resignation." Daniman v. Board of
Education, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 878 (1954). The court stated
that teachers work for the state upon reasonable terms laid down
by the state and not upon their own terms. In Board of Education
v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 100, 270 P.2d 82 (1954), a teacher
was dismissed for refusing to answer questions concerning her
alleged communist activities. Here the teacher did not plead the
fifth amendment but invoked another basis for refusal. The court
found that mere refusal to answer questions made her guilty of
unprofessional conduct and subject to dismissal. The court stated:
"[a] teacher's employment in the public schools is a privilege, not
a right. A condition implicit in that privilege is loyalty to the government under which the school system functions. It is the duty
of every teacher to answer proper questions in relation to his fitness
to teach our youth when put to him by a lawfully constituted body
authorized to propound such questions."
In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E.
517 (1892), the court recognized the demarcation between a person's rights as a citizen and those as a policeman. There Mr. Justice
Holmes stated; "[t] he petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." In Christalv. Police Comm'n of San Francisco,38 Cal. App.
2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939), police officers refused to testify before
a grand jury. The court stated the privilege "may be exercised by
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all persons, including police officers, in any proceeding, civil or
criminal." However, "duty required them to answer. Privilege
permitted them to refuse to answer. They chose to exercise the
privilege, but the exercise of such privilege was wholly inconsistent
with their duty as police officers. They claim that they had a constitutional right to refuse to answer under the circumstances, but it
is certain that they had no constitutional right to remain police
officers in the face of their clear violation of the duty imposed
upon them."
In a case where police officers were discharged for refusing
to waive immunity from prosecution which might arise out of
testimony before a grand jury, the court stated: "the basic question is not the right of the public officer to exercise a constitutional
privilege but whether their refusal was a breach of their public
trust .

. . ."

The court decided that the exercise of the privilege

was inconsistent with their duty as police officers. Drury v. Hurley,
339 Ill. App. 38, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949).
The majority opinion in the principal case recognizes the distinction between the rights of an individual in his general capacity
as a citizen and his rights as a teacher or police officer, but says
there is no such distinction concerning lawyers. Sheiner v. State,
supra at 658; accord, In -re Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963
(1940). However, do policemen and teachers owe a greater duty
to support our government than do lawyers who actively participate in the operation of the judicial machinery, a vital branch of
government? It is submitted that lawyers because of the integral
part they play in the judicial function of government owe as much,
if not more, of a duty to support our government than do teachers
and police officers. The court possesses an inherent power to disbar
which could be exercised without statutory reasons so that there is
no need for a statute authorizing disbarment under the circumstances of the principal case. State Bar of Michigan v. Hartford,
282 Mich. 124, 275 N.W. 791 (1937).
As was stated by Lord Mansfield, "the question is whether, after
the conduct of this man, it is proper that he should continue a
member of a profession which should stand free from all suspicion." Ex parte Brownsall, 2 Cowp. 829, 98 Eng. Rep. 1885 (1778).
However, it should be noted that in a very recent United
States Supreme Court case, the Court stated that the dismissal of
a teacher for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination is a
violation of due process of law. Slochower v. Board of Higher
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Education of City New York, 24 U.S.L. WEE 4178 (U.S. April 10,
1956) (5-4 decision). Although it is not readily ascertainable, the
future effect of this decision may prove to be extreme. Hence
former cases discussed above may be overruled. But it is the
opinion of the writer that if this case is to be applied as a comprehensive rule and not easily distinguishable on it6 facts, it is unsound in principle. It should also be noted that this was a 5 to 4
decision which although binding law at the present, may cast
some doubt as to the future.
M. J. P.
CoNsTIrTnuONAL LAw-DUE PRocEss-WAVm
JECT TO COMPOSITION OF GnAND
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JRm.-D (Poret), arrested in 1951

and charged with rape, eluded officers and fled the State of Louisiana. He was indicted for the crime of rape shortly thereafter, but
his location was not discovered until about a year later when it
was learned that he was imprison in Tennessee. Upon completion
of the Tennessee prison term in 1953, D was returned to Louisiana
where he was arraigned. He pleaded to the indictment and entered
a motion for severance, another defendant (Labat) having been
joined with him. The motion was denied and D then entered a
motion to quash the indictment because of the systematic exclusion
of Negroes from the grand jury which had returned the indictment.
The motion was denied upon the ground that it was made too late.
The Louisiana supreme court affirmed, holding that § 202 of the
Louisiana Criminal Code as interpreted, required that all such objections be made before the end of the third judicial day following
the term of the grand jury by which the attacked indictment had
been returned and that D's motion, therefore, came more than a
year and a half too late. Held, that a state may attach reasonable
time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional rights. "The
test is whether the defendant has had 'a reasonable opportunity to
have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined by the
State court."' The fact that D was a fugitive does not give him
immunity from the operation of a valid state statute. The fact that
D had no lawyer during the eighty-seven day period from his indictment to the expiration of his time to file the motion to quash
does not alter the situation for he, by his own voluntary action,
"failed to avail himself of Louisiana's adequate remedies." Conviction affirmed. Poret and Labat, Petitionersv. Louisiana,850 U.S.
91 (1955).
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